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Abstract: Since the oil price downturn of 2015, the United Arab Emirates and fellow Gulf Cooperation
Council countries have worked hard to expand digital payments in the interest of improved tax and
revenue collection, transparency, and security. Yet despite a deep transformation and diversification of
their payment eco-systems and the formalization of plans to become “cashless economies” modelled
on South Korea and Sweden, cash continues to dominate payments in both countries. While industry
players typically attribute the prevalence of cash in the region to questions of infrastructure readiness,
transaction costs, and cyber-security, this paper finds that plans to expand digital payments at the
expense of cash may not be well-adapted to countries with high levels of socio-economic inequality.
It proposes a link between socio-economic inequality and use of cash in emerging economies,
and concludes that it may be better to not view the relationship between cash and digital payments in
binary zero-sum terms, until there is a better understanding of the socio-economic, technological,
and policy context in which countries like South Korea and Sweden have managed to reduce their
reliance on cash in favor of a diversified digital payments eco-system.
Keywords: digital payments; cashless economy; financial inclusion; complementary currencies;
inequality; non-cash transactions; Gulf Cooperation Council; oil economies; remittances
1. Introduction
Following the oil price downturn of 2015 and its wide-ranging economic repercussions,
the United Arab Emirates and fellow Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have worked
hard to expand digital payments in the interest of improved tax and revenue collection, as well as the
greater transparency and security associated with moving away from cash. Regulatory reforms have
resulted in a deep transformation and diversification of the payment landscape, with a widespread
consensus among monetary authorities and financial institutions about the benefits of a cashless
economy for businesses and individuals in terms of efficiency gains and ease of payments. The UAE’s
national payments strategy seeks a gradual transition to a cashless economy, while in Saudi Arabia the
central bank has set out to achieve 70 percent cashless payments by 2030. The two countries have also
unveiled plans to launch a central bank digital currency called “Aber” backed by distributed ledger
technologies, to be trialed initially for cross-border payments by a small pool of participating banks,
and expanded for wider use. Yet despite a concerted effort by monetary authorities, banks, and the
payments industry to replace cash with digital payments, cash continues to dominate payments in
the GCC. The objective of this paper is to explore the reasons as to why cash is so persistent in the
GCC states, and whether the adoption of a digital payments eco-system modelled on South Korea and
Sweden is appropriate for these countries in light of their relatively large unbanked populations and
the continued importance of cash-based remittances.
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2. Background Literature
Economists have long seen the reduction in the use of cash and the transition to digital payment
methods as part of the natural evolution of monetary and payment systems (Trautwein 1997). Much of
the literature related to the cashless or the “pure credit” economy has focused on the implications of
the elimination of cash for interest rates, prices, and output. Woodford, for example, has demonstrated
how in a cashless economy central banks can manage price levels through control over nominal interest
rates, enabling markets to operate normally (Walsh and Woodford 2005). More recently, Rogoff (2016)
has argued that policies aimed at reducing cash or at least eliminating large notes can contribute to
reining in the shadow economy, illicit trade, and tax evasion. He notes that the shadow economy in the
United States accounts for between 7 to 10 percent of GDP, resulting in a significant loss of tax revenue
to the US government, and is facilitated by the anonymity associated with cash transactions, compared
to more traceable digital payment methods (Rogoff 2015).
Despite a wide consensus around the potential benefits of a cashless economy, the concept has
not been without its detractors. Cohen et al. (2020) demonstrate that cash plays an essential role in
intermediating transactions between the formal and informal sectors, and that its elimination can
disrupt the ability to trade between these sectors, leading to a misallocation of productive efforts across
an economy. The authors also bring to light other potentially unexpected negative consequences,
such as the greater lengths actors in the shadow economy will go to launder money into the official
sector in the absence of cash. Lagos and Zhang (2019), for their part, have shown the existence of a
“cashless limit” in a pure credit economy, arguing that even if money is not frequently used, the fact
that it is available as an alternative to credit has important implications for aggregate consumption,
investment, and output.
Most studies have addressed the topic from a theoretical perspective or from the context of
advanced economies. Much less work has been done on the desirability of eliminating cash in favor of
digital payments in emerging economies, and on the relationship between cash and digital payments
in countries with high levels of socio-economic inequality. India’s, albeit dramatic, experience with
demonetization in late 2016, when the government withdrew large denomination notes with the
intention of enhancing tax collection and shrinking the informal economy, has served to shed some
light on this issue. Bajaj and Damodaran (2020) found that in the period following demonetization,
aggregate household output declined by 20 percent, and aggregate welfare by 16 percent, with the
consequences unevenly distributed between urban and rural households. The authors also described
how switching to digital payments involved an entry cost which was unaffordable to the lower income
deciles, whose welfare was more adversely affected than their wealthier counterparts. Karmakar and
Narayanan (2019), for their part, found that households with no bank accounts experienced significant
declines in both income and spending in the month following demonetization, with many resorting to
informal borrowing to meet immediate needs.
3. The Transformation of the Payments Eco-System in the UAE
The deep transformation of the payments landscape in the UAE, and initiatives to eliminate cash
and trial a digital currency, are not surprising. The region counts among the wealthiest and most
advanced countries in the world, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE ranked in the Global Competitiveness
Index as world leaders in terms of macro-economic stability, while the UAE ranks second in the world
for ICT adoption, behind only South Korea, and 15th in terms of the quality of its institutions, ahead
of Australia, Germany, Japan, and the United States, reflective of its unmatched infrastructure and
the great strides it has made in e-government services. In early 2017, the UAE central bank launched
new electronic payment regulations, permitting peer-to-peer and retail players to participate in the
country’s payments eco-system alongside banks. The following year, the central bank announced a
national payments strategy, which in addition to strengthening the security and efficiency of payments,
and bringing down transaction costs, set the objective of gradually transitioning to a cashless economy.
The e-dirham—a reloadable prepaid card required to pay for government services—initially launched
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in 2001 with moderate success, is also subject to a major revamp in collaboration with 22 of the country’s
banks. In parallel with the UAE, the Saudi central bank announced the objective of achieving 70 percent
cashless payments across the kingdom over the next decade, as part of the financial sector reform plans
integrated within Saudi Vision 2030. These policies crystallized cashless economy objectives that have
been under discussion since at least 2012.
In the UAE, the new regulations encouraged the entry into the country’s payments eco-system
of a new class of payment gateways and processors, with a somewhat baffling mix of international
players setting up shop alongside home-grown initiatives, the fruit of local start-up and FinTech hubs.
For e-commerce—here taken to mean payments transacted on the internet via mobile, smartphone,
or tablet—there are at least 15 players. This includes major international groups like Amazon’s Payfort,
Telr, jointly launched in the UAE and Singapore, India’s CCAvenue, as well as local entities like PayBy,
Foloosi, and Bahrain’s PayTabs. Some local players had moved beyond online payments and were
rolling out point-of-sale devices for in-store payments, competing in an area traditionally controlled
by banks. Noon, one of the region’s largest online retailers, launched its own payment gateway in
2020, arming itself with a captive business. With 1.4 million Chinese tourists visiting the region in
2018, China’s QFPay also entered the market through a local joint venture, enabling Chinese visitors to
transact QR-code based payments with Alipay and WeChat Pay at shops and restaurants (Visele 2019).
On the eWallet side, Beam, an early mover that first launched in the UAE in 2012, with an attractive
points and rewards scheme, soon found itself in competition with “the Pays”—Apple, Samsung, and
Google Pay. Not to be outdone, 16 UAE banks joined forces to launch the Emirates Digital Wallet KLIP,
which sets out specifically to eliminate cash from the economy, while in Dubai the reloadable NOL
transport card used for the metro was expanded to enable payments in taxis and at corner shops. It is
in fact hard to keep up with eWallet and prepaid card schemes in the UAE—particularly stand-alone
initiatives set up by telcos, retailers, or individual banks—with many failing to gain any traction
despite otherwise high-profile launches.
UAE payment industry and FinTech players frequently take South Korea and Sweden as models
to replicate in terms of achieving a cashless future. Yet in a world where few countries have succeeded
in reducing cash in favor of digital payments, it is interesting to consider what specific attributes
these countries share that have made them amenable to a cashless eco-system and whether they can
serve as appropriate benchmarks for the GCC states. Notable attributes of these countries are high
levels of literacy, moderate levels of income inequality, and almost universal access to smartphones
and mobile data. Additionally, close to one hundred percent of the adult population in South Korea
and Sweden are banked. This is very different from the situation in the GCC, where a substantial
part of the population consists of migrant laborers and blue-collar workers, excluded from the formal
banking system.
In the UAE, 32 percent of the working population, 1.7 million individuals, is unbanked, earning
less than USD 679 per month, as set out in Table 1. The additional 19 percent of workers between the
USD 680 to USD 1359 band are partially unbanked, as the minimum usually required for opening
a bank account is USD 1360. This means that at reasonable estimates, 35 percent of the working
population, some 1.9 million individuals, are unbanked, out of a total active labor force of 5.5 million
in 2018. These are reliant on money exchanges, and formal and informal networks to receive their
wages and remit home savings. Additionally, while some of the unbanked may be able to afford
smartphones, it is uncertain whether this segment could easily pay for a monthly mobile data plan
to transact mobile payments, once rent, food, transport, and remittances are factored in. With UAE
nationals comprising 11 percent of the total population of 9.6 million and concentrated in the upper
income tiers with strong social safety nets, the unbanked segment is also overwhelmingly comprised
of foreign workers. These socio-economic inequalities are also captured in the Human Development
Index, where the percentage of unskilled labor is 41 and 47 percent for Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
respectively, placing them closer to developing and emerging economies for this indicator than the
high-income group to which they belong.
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Table 1. Monthly income segmentation in the United Arab Emirates, in US dollars 1, 2018.
Income Range (USD) Percent Employed Working Population Total Estimated Unbanked vs.Banked Population
1 to 269 17% 936,485 32 percent of working population
270 to 679 15% 803,239 unbanked, ~1.7 M individuals
680 to 1359 19% 1,061,177 19 percent partially unbanked,~1 M individuals
1360 to 5399 27% 1,486,040
5400 to 13,599 11% 589,109 40 percent of working population
13,600 to 20,399 1.4% 78,409 banked, ~2.2 M individuals
Above 20,300 0.6% 33,722
Unclassified 9% 484,974
Total 100% 5,463,155
1 Income segments converted to USD and rounded for presentation purposes. Source: (UAE Federal Competitiveness
and Statistics Authority 2018), Labor Force.
Despite the large unbanked population, the banking sector and payments industry has maintained
a positive outlook with regards to the future of digital payments in the region. In 2018, Mastercard
attributed the unprecedented growth of mobile payments in the UAE to the country’s large youth
demographic and a mobile penetration rate of 173 percent, described as the “highest in the world”
(Mastercard 2018). In reality, the figure is misleading as while mobile ownership is certainly high,
smartphone adoption probably does not exceed 73 percent (Finastra 2018), an indicator difficult to
measure given the UAE’s wealthy frequently own multiple smartphones. Boston Consulting Group,
for its part, estimated that achieving a cashless economy in the GCC would provide “at least a 1%
boost to non-oil GDP, equating to nearly $3 billion” and that it was important for monetary authorities
to continue addressing barriers to cashless uptake, such as high transaction costs, and cybersecurity
and infrastructure readiness (BCG 2019; Khan et al. 2019). In parallel, the consensus at the Success 2020
Arabian Business Forum held in Dubai in October 2019 was that the “UAE is moving ever closer to
becoming a cashless society”, with Visa’s representative for the UAE explaining that it was important
to encourage “smaller retailers and businesses on to the cashless economy” (Halligan 2019). Equally,
the region’s press is awash with reports of the “e-payments revolution”, the “cashless society”, and the
“end of cash”.
In practice, one cannot blame banks or the payments industry for generating hype around digital
payments. The payments business, whether online or in-person at points-of-sale, is lucrative. In the
UAE, and mirrored around the world, merchant service fees per transaction, hidden to the buyer,
range from around one percent for in-person transactions, to up to 3.0 percent for online payments.
These commissions are shared between the acquiring bank, the card association (i.e., Mastercard, Visa),
and the payment gateway. It is more of a volume than a value business, which is why the industry
has long been more focused on the volume than on the value of transactions, as large payments are
less frequent, and are as likely to be made by bank transfer or cheque. From this perspective, the two
most promising regions for the growth of digital payments are the emerging markets of East Asia,
the Middle East and Africa, as set out in Figure 1. In the latter, non-cash transactions are forecasted to
grow by 23.1 percent between 2017 and 2022, to reach 139 billion transactions, which explains why the
payments industry is so keen on the region, particularly when compared to more mature markets in
North America and Europe. In the UAE, digital payment uptake has been strong across all sectors,
including retail, transport, food delivery, and subscription services (i.e., music and video). Progress
in peer-to-peer payments has been slower, partly because of the continued prominence of in-person
paper-based know-your-customer (KYC) protocols to sign up for financial services, but regulations in
this area are also catching up.
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While infrastructure readiness and transaction costs, particularly for smaller businesses, certainly
have something to do with the continued preference for cash, one angle that has been less explored is
the relationship between cash transactions and the unbanked population. One only needs to visit UAE
exchange houses on payday in a y given month to witne s the queues of w kers waiting to remit
money home, often in the f rm of cas , sometim s via payroll ca ds on which wages are disburs d,
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to understand why cash remains important in GCC economies. UAE-based foreign workers remitted
USD 45 billion to their home countries, mainly in East and South Asia in 2019—the equivalent of 11
percent of the UAE’s GDP (UAE Central Bank 2019). This was just through formal channels. The World
Bank estimates that an additional 35 to 75 percent of the total value of global remittances are delivered
through informal channels (Freund and Spatafora 2005). In the Middle East, individuals send funds
via the age-old hawala system, a trust-based network where cash is handed to a local agent, either a
corner shop or a designated community member, whose counterpart in the home country disburses the
funds to the intended recipient, against a small commission. While hawala operates outside of formal
channels, it is essential for sustaining remittance corridors to locations where recipients have no easy
access to exchange houses or banks. In the absence of digital money transfer technologies accessible to
both senders and recipients along these corridors, it is difficult to imagine how this segment of the
population can forgo cash.
This leads to the interesting question of whether a link can be established more generally between
socio-economic inequality and reliance on cash. In Figure 3, the Gini coefficient for income inequality
within countries is compared to the total value of payments transacted in cash for 37 emerging and
advanced economies. What is apparent is that countries like Sweden and South Korea that have
implemented solid digital payment eco-systems and substantially reduced cash are also among the
least unequal societies in the world. In Saudi Arabia and South Africa, the latter one of the world’s most
unequal societies, cash continues to dominate payments, despite otherwise advanced infrastructure,
booming industrial sectors, and high levels of integration into the global economy. While no Gini
coefficient was available for the UAE, Saudi Arabia’s position on the chart is a good approximation of
the position of GCC states. What the chart suggests is that in countries with high levels of inequality,
eliminating cash may be more challenging, especially where bank accounts and digital payments
solutions are out-of-reach to poorer segments of society, or represent a high switching cost, as discussed
by Bajaj and Damodaran (2020).
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the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The countries included in the sample are listed in
Appendix A (UNDP 2019; FIS 2020).
There is no doubt that in the UAE and the GCC more needs to be done to promote financial
inclusion. A recent IMF report on the region found significant gaps in access to finance, particularly
for women, youth, and small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs). The latter only received 4.5 percent of
total bank loans, lower than the regional average for the Middle East and North Africa. The report also
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highlighted the continued importance of informal finance, echoing the findings related to remittances
and the use of cash above, but this time in relation to loans, stating that “26 percent of adults in GCC
reported having borrowed informally”, compared to 13 percent in advanced economies, and that
“GCC households rely on informal financing channels, where peer financing . . . remains the dominant
source of financing, with bank loans being the residual” (Ben Ltaifa et al. 2018). The situation for
SMEs, which in the UAE account for an estimated 60 percent of non-oil GDP, has been particularly
challenging since the oil-price downtown of 2015. This set off a wave of SME loan defaults equivalent
to USD 1.4 billion, hitting the banking sector and drying up new loans, particularly trade finance, the
main lubricant in oil economies where the retail sector is entirely reliant on imports (Everington 2015).
This as the region registered its largest ever current account deficit of USD 127 billion, equivalent to
9.1 percent of combined GDP, putting immense pressure on the maintenance of the US dollar anchor
(Iradian and Preston 2016). In fact, much of the drive by monetary authorities to expand digital
payments can be traced to the oil-price downturn of 2015 and the subsequent implementation of a
value-added tax regime in all six GCC states, as governments cut spending and scrambled to make up
for lost revenue. This from the perspective that digital payments leave a clearer accounting trail and
result in better tax collection.
Another reason for the prevalence of cash payments is that in countries with high socio-economic
inequality, financial literacy tends to be low. In both Saudi Arabia and the UAE, efforts are nonetheless
being made to increase participation in the formal banking system. Saudi Arabia’s Financial Sector
Development Program has sought to enhance financial planning skills for youth and women and
increase access to digital financial services for the unbanked. These efforts seem to have yielded
positive results, with 69 percent of adults having bank accounts in 2017, compared to 51 percent in
2011. In the UAE, financial literacy initiatives seem to be more focused on middle- and upper-income
earners to improve individual financial planning, while one FinTech, NOW Money, has launched a
mobile banking and remittance solution for low-income workers (Buller 2020). On the SME front,
the Emirates Development Bank in 2019 launched a USD 27 million credit guarantee to improve access
to finance for small businesses.
4. The Relationship between Cash and Digital Payments in Emerging Economies
The broader point related to the cashless economy, both in the economics literature as well as
in payment industry circles, is that the choice between cash and digital payments is often presented
as a binary one. This supposes a linear evolution from cash to digital payments, where a rise in
digital payments should result in a decline in the use of cash. It is a view that intuitively makes sense
and is often repeated in GCC banking and payment industry circles. Reality, however, appears to
be more nuanced, with empirical data showing that for most emerging and advanced economies,
both digital payments and cash-in-circulation are on the rise. Figure 4 looks at currency-in-circulation
as a percentage of GDP for nine major developed and emerging economies, showing declines only
in Russia and Sweden since 2007. In the seven other markets, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE,
currency-in-circulation—that is, cash outside of banks and deposit-taking institutions—has increased.
Some interesting work has been done to explain this counter-intuitive phenomenon, even if it is not yet
fully understood.
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Figure 4. Currency-in-circulation as a percentage of GDP in nine emerging and advanced economies,
2007 and 2019. M0 is defined as currency-in-circulation outside banks, though the S Federal Reserve
includes in its definition vault money, held by banks to meet the immediate cash needs of clients.
All data are drawn from the respective central bank of each country. The first data point for the E
relates to 2010 in the absence of older data.
Ashworth and Goodhart (2020), analyzing the Eurozone, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States, demonstrate remarkably that cash-in-circulation has been consistently on the increase
in these markets since the 1990s. Recent increases could be correlated to the low interest rates that
have prevailed since the global financial crisis, as well as the rise of the shadow economy and informal
work. A BIS study focused on 20 emerging and advanced economies for the period 2000 to 2016 found
that cash-in-circulation had increased from 7 to 9 percent of GDP during the period (Bech et al. 2018).
The report reached similar conclusions with regard to low interest rates, as individuals had less
incentive to hold money in savings accounts. The authors also found that currency holdings related
particularly to higher denomination notes, leading them to speculate that money was likely being held
more with a store-of-value purpose in mind than as a means of payment.
Less is known about the reasons underlying the increase in cash-in-circulation in emerging
economies or those with large unbanked populations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the adoption
of mobile money and e-wallets as alternatives to bank accounts has resulted in an expansion of the
cash-based economy. More than 60 percent of mobile money transactions globally are based on the
cash-in-cash-out model, where individuals utilize licensed agents to either top-up or receive cash held
in mobile wallets, enabling them to disburse salaries or transact peer-to-peer payments across large
distances (Naghavi 2019). Additionally, this is not just for within-country transfers. A significant
proportion of remittances between France and major west African economies like Côte d’Ivoire, Mali,
and Senegal are transacted via Orange Money, one of the most widely used mobile money applications
in French-speaking Africa.
Similarly, in South Africa, the country’s leading economics advisory firm, Genesis Analytics,
found in 2018 that a rise in non-performing micro-loans had resulted in a return to mobile money,
prepaid cards and cash, and an avoidance of bank accounts, where positive balances can automatically
be debited to settle outstanding debts. To match the services offered by mobile money, South African
banks also enabled their customers to make instant cash transfers to anyone in the country with access
to an ATM terminal, with no need for the recipient to hold an account at the bank (Ketley 2018);
another example of digital technologies expanding cash-in-circulation. What these trends reveal is
that for many emerging markets, the relationship between cash and digital payments may not be a
zero-sum game. Rather, the cash-based and the digital economy appear to reinforce each other, with
digital technologies boosting cash-in-circulation, and cash-in-circulation in turn sustaining the digital
payments eco-system. While further study is required to better understand these trends in emerging
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markets, what they suggest is that policies seeking to eliminate cash prematurely may result in more
harm than good.
5. Conclusions
The drive towards a cashless economy in Saudi Arabia and the UAE seems to have hit a wall,
despite the best efforts of monetary authorities, banks, and the payments industry to establish a
world-class digital payments eco-system modelled on South Korea and Sweden. Both economies
remain heavily cash-reliant, with cash accounting for 67 percent of the total value of payments in the
UAE in 2019, and 64 percent in Saudi Arabia. Explanations for this trend tend to point to infrastructure
readiness, cybersecurity concerns, and high transaction costs, particularly merchant service fees
for small businesses. Much less work, however, has been done to understand the socio-economic
context in which countries like South Korea and Sweden, among the world’s most egalitarian societies,
have reduced their reliance on cash and diversified their payment eco-systems, and whether this is
comparable to the UAE, where an estimated 35 percent of the working population is unbanked, where
cash-based remittance corridors continue to be important, and where informal lending is still prevalent
among businesses and households. In discussing the cases of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, this paper
has also sought to reflect on a tendency in economics, as well as in industry circles, to see cash and
digital payments in binary terms, with a linear evolution expected from one to the other. In reality,
across the world cash-in-circulation is increasing in parallel with digital payments, in a dynamic that is
still not fully understood. For emerging economies, it may well be that cash and digital payments play
complementary and not alternative roles. This does not mean that such countries should renounce
plans to become cashless economies, but that these plans would need to be backed by financial inclusion
initiatives that promote equitable access to digital financial services, connectivity, and infrastructure.
The alternative could mean adding digital exclusion to long-standing socio-economic exclusion.
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Appendix A
The countries included in the sample in Figure 3 are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, UK, USA, Vietnam.
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